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INTRODUCTION
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents arrested and con-
victed John Doe for selling five marijuana cigarettes to Mary
Smith. The prosecutors promised John that if he pleaded guilty,
they would recommend no jail time. John entered a guilty plea,
but at sentencing, DEA agents introduced testimony from an
undisclosed informant who stated that over a four-year period, the
informant had bought a total of one kilogram of marijuana from
John in fifty different transactions. The informant also stated that
the drug sales had taken place on the same street corner, at the
same time of day, and with the same intricacies of exchange as
John's sale to Mary.
John admitted selling the drugs to Mary, but protested strenu-
ously that he was not responsible for the other sales. John was
telling the truth: The informant invented the information so that
he would receive future leniency from the agents. However, nei-
ther the agents nor the judge discovered that the informant had
fabricated the story.
The DEA agents maintained that the informant had always
been reliable in the past. John, however, never learned the identi-
ty of the informant; nor was he ever given the opportunity to
confront the informant's testimony. The sentencing judge deter-
mined, from the agents' comments, that there were enough "par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness"1 to allow the one kilo-
gram of marijuana to be considered under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' definition of "same course of conduct."2 When the
t With thanks and gratitude to Professor Sara Sun Beale for her inspiration and
encouragement. Also special thanks to Professors Robert Simon and Rick Werner for
their advice and guidance.
1. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
2. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (Nov.
1991) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL].
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judge added the one kilogram to the five marijuana cigarettes (2.5
grams),3 the total was 1.0025 kilograms.
The judge sentenced John for a level 10 offense. Absent the
informant's testimony the judge would have sentenced John for a
level 6 offense.! Under a level 6 offense, John might not have had
to serve any time in prison, assuming he had no criminal history.'
Under the level 10 offense, however, John would have to serve a
minimum of six months in jail, with a possible sentence of twelve
months.6 John would have to serve this jail time despite his deal
with the prosecutors. If John's right to confront his accusers had
extended to sentencing, he might have been able to show that the
informant's testimony was false. John's situation, although hypo-
thetical, demonstrates the real possibility for injustice under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 19847 created the United
States Sentencing Commission (the Commission).' Congress gave
the Commission the task of promulgating binding federal sentenc-
ing guidelines (the Guidelines).' The Guidelines took effect in
1987 and courts have imposed them for offenses committed after
November 1, 1987."0 Many courts, though, have expressed concern
that defendants are not adequately protected under the new sys-
tem." In particular, some courts have held that confrontation
rights should extend to sentencing. 2
Confrontation rights find their source in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 and the Confrontation
3. Id. § 2D1.1. Each marijuana cigarette is converted to .5 gram, or .0005 kilogram.
4. See id. The Sentencing Guidelines prescribe higher sentences for higher levels.
5. See id. § 5A (sentencing table).
6. See id.
7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified principally at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 and 28 U.S.C. 99 991-998 (1988)).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
9. Id. § 994(a).
10. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 2031, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 99-217, §§ 2, 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985); Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 35, 100 Stat.
3599 (1986); Pub. L. No. 100-182, § 2, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987); see generally William W.
Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 496 (1990).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100 (3d Cir. 1990) (Circuit
Judge Edward Becker criticizing the lack of procedural protection for some defendants).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled by
United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1992).
13. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, "[N]or shall any State deprive any
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Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 4 The Supreme Court early on
applied to the states procedural safeguards that were "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty";15 courts therefore addressed con-
frontation issues under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. More recent cases have focused on the attributes of
the actual criminal justice system involved.16 In 1965, the Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment." From that point on, courts
addressed confrontation rights either under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment. Since the Bill of Rights was extended to
the states, both the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation
Clause have been addressed by the courts. The two protections
are often grouped together as "confrontation rights" or simply
"confrontation."
This Note advocates that confrontation rights should apply to
sentencing under the Guidelines. Without confrontation rights at
sentencing, defendants are not adequately protected. Defendants
did not need these protections under the old sentencing system
because the sentencing judge exercised a large degree of discre-
tion." Under the Guidelines, however, sentences are imposed
mandatorily; some courts therefore have held that under the
Guidelines confrontation rights should be extended to sentenc-
ing.
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... .
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
16. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
17. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
18. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1965).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991),
vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100
(8th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992). Al-
though these cases were reversed, the initial arguments for extending confrontation rights
remain compelling.
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Part I of this Note describes the differences between sentenc-
ing before the enactment of the Guidelines and sentencing under
the Guidelines regime. Under the earlier, indeterminate system,
judges maintained a wide degree of latitude in sentencing. Now
the Guidelines restrict judges' discretion by mandating sentencing
ranges. Part II outlines the caselaw applying confrontation rights
to sentencing. Cases under the indeterminate system rejected ex-
tending confrontation rights, but recent cases under the Guidelines
have advocated extending them. Part III analyzes the arguments
for and against applying confrontation rights to sentencing. Finally,
Part IV concludes that both the Due Process Clause -of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment mandate confrontation rights at sentencing under the
Guidelines.
I. A TALE OF TWO SYSTEMS
This Part traces the development of sentencing from the for-
mer indeterminate system to the current guidelines system. Section
A describes the old system, which, based on the theory that pris-
oners could be rehabilitated, gave sentencing judges a large
amount of discretion to determine which prisoners required more
rehabilitation than others. Section B explains the process by which
sentencing has changed; Congress started the process by defining
the goals for a new Guidelines system, then established a Sentenc-
ing Commission to implement these goals. Section C outlines how
the Guidelines function, and shows how the different requirements
of the Guidelines work to define each prisoner's sentence.
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
Prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, the federal govern-
ment had for over a century used an indeterminate sentencing
model, based on considerations of rehabilitation.? Because the
consensus view was that each individual had a different potential
for rehabilitation, judges did not determine sentences on the basis
20. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1988). Because rehabilitation times
differ for each prisoner, judges must make a determination about each prisoner's poten-
tial for rehabilitation and sentence accordingly. Id. This presupposes that the sentencing
judge will be able to ascertain which defendants require more time in prison to be reha-
bilitated.
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of the crime committed. Instead, Congress gave judges a great
degree of discretion to impose sentences within wide statutory
ranges.2'
Many critics disapproved of the indeterminate system, because
the large amount of discretion given to sentencing judges led to
serious disparities in sentences for similar crimes.' For example,
Marvin E. Frankel, former United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, wrote that "those of us whose
profession is the law must not choose any longer to tolerate a
regime of unreasoned, unconsidered caprice for exercising the
most awful power of organized society, the power to take liberty
and ... life by process of what purports to be law. '
Responding to such criticism, in 1983 the United States Sen-
ate issued a report referring to the "outmoded rehabilitation mod-
el" and noting that the current system was not furthering the goal
of rehabilitation.' The report found that the indeterminate sys-
tem had two main flaws: first, the sentences imposed upon simi-
larly situated offenders varied greatly;' and second, the amount
of jail time an offender would receive was too unpredictable.'
Both flaws made the indeterminate sentencing system unjust.
B. The Process of Change
Reform of the indeterminate system started in the 1970sY In
1976, California abolished its parole board and established statuto-
ry presumptive sentences for all serious offenses.' In the eight
years between 1976 and 1984, more than twenty states followed
California in revising their sentencing laws.' These revisions con-
21. Id. at 364.
22. Id. at 365.
23. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972).
24. S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3221.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See SANDRA SHANE-DuBow ET AL, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT (National Inst. of Justice 1985) (state-by-state
survey); Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and Correction
Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550, 1551 (1981).28. California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, ch. 1139, § 273, 1976 Cal. Stat.
5140 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 1991)).
29. See SHANE-DUBOW ET AL, supra note 27.
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sisted of abolishing parole, narrowing the role of judicial discre-
tion, and creating sentencing guidelines?
In 1984 the United States Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.31 The Act had five stated goals:
1. To promote certainty in sentencing by mandating charge-
offense sentencing and by eliminating parole;33
2. To require sentencing judges to state the reasons for
their decisions, so that appeal would be possible;
3. To achieve proportionality in sentencing;'5
4. To reduce the amount of disparity in sentences of simi-
larly situated offenders;' and
5. To establish a sentencing commission that would promul-
gate sentencing guidelines.'
Congress mandated a guidelines system with the hope that it
would reduce the existing sentencing disparities yet allow sentenc-
ing judges a certain measure of flexibility to compensate for indi-
vidual circumstances.' The Guidelines, therefore, present a mix of
the determinate and indeterminate sentencing systems.
The new guidelines system rejects rehabilitation as a goal of
imprisonment.39 Instead, the new legislation seeks retribution, edu-
cation, deterrence, and incapacitation.' Further, the Commission
made the Guidelines binding on the courts,4' and authorized ap-
pellate review of sentencing determinations.42
30. See id. at 290-92.
31. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified principally at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988)). The Act established the United States Sentencing Commission with
instructions to create a Guidelines system that would promote the five goals of the Act.
Id. § 217(a), 98 Stat. at 2017-18.
32. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3239.
Charge-offense sentencing mandates a set sentence for each type of crime. Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They
Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 9 (1988).
33. Sentencing Reform Act § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. at 2027 (repealing 18 U.S.C. §§
4201-4218 (1982)); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 60, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3243.
34. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 60, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3243.
35. Id. at 50-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3233-35.
36. Id. at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235.
37. Id. at 159-62, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3342-45.
38. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1988).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
41. Id. § 3553(a), (b).
42. Id. § 3742(e), (f). An appellate court must review sentencing determinations using
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C. The Guidelines System
The present system is a matrix that matches a sentencing
range with a defendant's offense level. The sentencing judge calcu-
lates the offense level by determining the base level of the
defendant's crime and then adjusting the level according to special
offender characteristics such as the defendant's criminal history
and/or acceptance of responsibility.' The amount of punishment,
however, cannot exceed the statutory maximum set for the base
offense by Congress.' Thus, the Guidelines stand as a fundamen-
tal change in sentencing: Although judges are permitted to adjust
the sentence levels if they discover reliable information of relevant
conduct, they no longer exercise unfettered discretion.4"
The simplest way to understand the Guidelines is to follow
their implementation through another example. Imagine a further
adventure of John Doe. Judge Vox Populi convicts Mr. Doe, who
has one prior serious conviction," for money laundering47
$200,000. At sentencing, the probation officer's presentence report
revealed information that Mr. Doe laundered an additional
$175,000. Further, the defendant admitted at trial that he knew
that the $200,000 he had admitted laundering had come from the
sale of narcotics.
At sentencing, the judge would proceed through the following
steps:'
1. Find the statute of conviction in the Guidelines' statutory
index. The judge will find Money Laundering and Monetary
Transaction Reporting under section 2S1.1.
2. Look up the base offense level for the conviction (Level23).49
3. Add "specific offense characteristics.""
a standard of "clear error" for the findings of fact, and a standard of unreasonableness
for the application of the Guidelines.
43. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 3A1.1-3E1.1.
44. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 375 (1989).
45. The Guidelines, however, leave judges the power to determine the reliability of
the factual information that guides where on the matrix a defendant's sentence will fall.
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 1B1.4.
46. That is, a conviction with a sentence of imprisonment exceeding thirteen months.
Id § 4A1.1(a).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A) (1988).
48. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 1B1.1.
49. Id. § 2SL.l(a)(1).
50. Breyer, supra note 32, at 6.
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a. Add three levels because defendant knew that the
money came from the sale of narcotics (raising the
offense to Level 26)."
b. Determine if the laundering of the additional $175,000
should be aggregated as "Relevant Conduct" (in this
case, yes).'
c. Therefore, add three levels for the amount of money
laundered (raising the offense level to Level 29)."3
4. Determine if any of the adjustments from chapter 3 of the
Guidelines apply. They include adjustments for a vulnerable
victim or an official victim, abduction of the victim, the
defendant's role in the offense, efforts to obstruct justice,
acceptance of responsibility, and rules for multiple counts
(assume none of these apply).'
5. Calculate a criminal history score based on the offender's
past conviction record. The Guidelines assign point values
depending on the number of prior convictions, and the seri-
ousness of those convictions.5 The sentencing judge then
totals the points; the higher the number of points, the more
the judge will increase the defendant's sentence.' Here,
section 4A1.1 assigns three points for one prior serious con-
victionY
6. Determine the sentence using the Guidelines matrix.' Here,
an offense level of 29, with three points for the prior con-
viction, yields a range of 97-121 months in prison."
7. Impose the Guideline sentence; or if the court finds unusual
factors, depart and impose a non-Guidelines sentence,' in
which case the judge must list reasons for the departure,61
51. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 2S1.1(b)(1).
52. Id § 1B1.3. Assume that the laundering of the $175,000 is found to be relevant
conduct under "same course of conduct." Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
53. See id. § 2S.L1(b)(2)(D).
54. Id. §§ 3A1.1- 3E1.1.
55. Id. § 4AL.1.
56. The sentence, however, may not exceed the statutory maximum set for the base
offense by Congress. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 375 (1989).
57. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 4A1.1(a).
58. Id. § 5A.
59. Id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). This provision adds an element of indeterminacy to
the Guidelines. The limited usefulness, however, and the restrictions on a judge's use of
it (listing the acceptable reasons for departure, and allowing appellate review of the rea-
sonableness of the departure) minimize its indeterminate effect.
61. Id. § 3553(c).
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and then the appellate court may review the reasonableness
of the departure.6
The Guidelines provide sentencing courts with a clear formula
for each defendant's sentence. The system prescribes that sentenc-
ing judges determine whether certain facts exist, and the Guide-
lines formulas mandate sentences accordingly.63 This added reli-
ance on the factfinding role of sentencing courts creates an en-
hanced concern for the reliability and accuracy of the information
considered by the judge.' Although courts have always ques-
tioned the reliability of factual determinations at sentencing,' the
added importance of factfinding under the Guidelines has recently
highlighted this issue.'
II. THE COURTS HAVE THEIR SAY
One aspect of courts' concern with the reliability of factfinding
during sentencing has been their evaluation of whether confronta-
tion rights apply at sentencing. The United States Supreme Court
first addressed this issue in Williams v. New York, 7 in which the
Court found that Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights did
not apply under the indeterminate sentencing system.' Another
pre-Guidelines case, Specht v. Patterson,9 limited Williams. Specht
held that Colorado's sentencing system was different enough from
the federal indeterminate system to implicate confrontation rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." The
case of United States v. Fatico7' then extended the analysis of the
62. Id. § 3742(e).
63. These factual determinations, coupled with the judge's appointment of the exact
sentence within the prescribed range, provide elements of indeterminacy in the Guidelines
that are carried over from the former sentencing system. The judge, however, may not
ignore factual determinations once they are found, and must invoke the Guidelines sen-
tences for those factual situations; he may only then adjust for specific offender charac-
teristics and departures. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 1B1.1(h), (i) & cmt. n.2.
64. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that
the factfinding underlying a departure must be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence when the magnitude of the departure is great).
65. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949).
66. See, eg., Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101.
67. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
68. Id. at 251.
69. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
70. Id. at 608.
71. 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
390 [Vol. 42:382
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
confrontation rights issue by analyzing the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment.7
After the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the courts began
reevaluating whether confrontation rights should apply at sen-
tencing. United States v. Castellanos,!3 in the Eleventh Circuit,
first raised the issue under the Guidelines; however, the court ulti-
mately found the argument for extending confrontation rights
unpersuasive. -Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in Beaulieu v. United
States4 also held that confrontation is not necessary at sentencing.
Shortly thereafter, the District Court for the District of Maine, in
United States v. Luna,75 followed Beaulieu. The Eighth Circuit,
however, found in United States v. Fortier6 that the Confrontation
Clause does apply at sentencing. The Fortier analysis was rejected
by the Third Circuit in United States v. Kikumura;" however, the
Sixth Circuit for a short time adopted the Fortier reasoning in
United States v. Silverman.:8
A. Cases Before the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In Williams v. New York, 9 the jury recommended life impris-
onment for Williams, convicted of first-degree murder.' At sen-
tencing, the trial judge considered -information about Williams's
previous, record. Williams, however, never confronted or cross-
examined the witnesses against him on that subject. 1 Then, after
considering all the relevant information, the judge sentenced Wil-
liams to death.' Williams challenged his sentence, claiming that
due process mandated that he have the opportunity to confront
the witnesses against him.'
72. Id. at 713-14. Fatico ultimately decided under the Confrontation Clause not to
apply confrontation rights to sentencing.
73. 882 F.2d 474 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 904 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990).
74. 893 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990).
75. 734 F. Supp. 552, 554 (D. Me. 1990).
76. 911 F.2d 100, 103 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d
393 (8th Cir. 1992).
77. 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990).
78. 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992)
(en banc).
79. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
80. Id. at 242.
81. Id. at 243.
82. Id. at 242.
83. Id. at 245.
1992
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In its analysis of the case, the Supreme Court explained the
philosophy of the indeterminate sentencing system.' The Court
stated that not every offense is a legal category. Individuals con-
victed of the same offense should not always be given identical
punishment;' instead, the philosophy of individualized sentencing,
which distinguishes, among other things, between first-time and re-
peat offenders, will necessarily have to take into account informa-
tion from nonjudicial agencies.'
Because "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective"
and "[r]eformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals," the Court determined, that the sentencing judge
must consider a wide range of information.' Therefore, allowing
cross-examination in open court of all the witnesses in a presen-
tence report is impractical, if not impossible.' "The due-process
clause," the Court concluded, "should not be treated as a device
for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of
trial procedure."' Therefore, although due process does apply at
sentencing, it does not guarantee all of the procedural protections
it guarantees at trial.
Seventeen years later, in Specht v. Patterson' the Supreme
Court interpreted Williams to mean that some sentencing systems
require confrontation rights." The State of Colorado convicted
Specht of indecent liberties under a statute that had a ten-year
maximum penalty.' However, the trial court sentenced him under
the state's Sex Offenders Act for an indeterminate term of from
one day to life imprisonment.? The act stipulated that it should
be applied if the trial court judge believed that the convicted per-
son would pose a physical threat to the public, or was a habitual
offender and was mentally ill? A psychiatrist examined Specht,
and filed a report with the trial court judge. 5 Although the case
84. Id. at 246-49.
85. Id. at 247.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 250.
89. Id. at 251.
90. 386 U.S. 605 (1966).
91. Id. at 610.
92. Id. at 607.
93. Id.
94. d.
95. Id. at 608.
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does not explicitly state so, the report must have suggested that
Specht was a physical threat to the public, because the range of
the sentence included life imprisonment.' However, the judge did
not hold a hearing on the psychiatrist's report.'
On appeal, Specht argued that the trial court had denied him
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had no
opportunity to challenge the psychiatric report." Although it ad-
hered to the Williams decision, the Supreme Court declined to
apply Williams in this "radically different situation."'99
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas observed that the Sex
Offenders Act did not make the commission of a specified crime
the basis for sentencing.l" Instead, the Colorado system made
one conviction the basis for starting another proceeding. 1 The
Court found Specht to be like those cases that arise under recidi-
vist statutes-in which an habitual crime issue is "a distinct
issue."' "c2 Douglas concluded that the Colorado system differed
significantly from the indeterminate system used in Williams be-
cause it called for the sentencing court to make a determination
on an issue that was separate from those decided at trial.1"
Based on this conclusion, the Court, required confrontation to
fulfill due process."°4
The Second Circuit further interpreted Williams in United
'States v. Fatico,'" holding that confrontation rights would be im-
practical at sentencing. The District Court for the Eastern District
of New York's opinion in this case,"° written by Judge
Weinstein, is especially important because it signaled the first
consideration of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amena-
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 610 (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 625 (1911)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 611.
105. 579 F.2d 707 (2nd Cir. 1978). Carmine and Daniel Fatico were indicted on charg-
es related to several truck hijackings. Id. at 709. They pled guilty to, and the court con-
victed them of, one count of conspiracy to possess a quantity of furs stolen from a for-
eign shipment. Id. As a result of their guilty pleas, they faced a maximum penalty of
five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id.
106. 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
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ment, instead of only the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the context of sentencing. The Second Circuit,
however, never separately analyzed the case on Sixth Amendment
grounds. Instead, the court declared the Sixth Amendment issue
moot, finding that the Confrontation Clause protects the same
rights as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' Thus, as Williams had already determined that the Due
Process Clause did not extend confrontation rights to sentencing,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court."°
Before sentencing, the Faticos objected to the inclusion in the
presentence reports of statements identifying them as members of
the Gambino organized crime family."° The government offered
corroborating evidence, but would not produce the informant for
fear that he would be harmed."° The defendants maintained that
the court denied their rights under the Due Process and Confron-
tation Clauses due to the refusal of the government to disclose the
identity of the informant."'
Judge Weinstein acknowledged the Williams holding requiring
different evidentiary rules governing trial and sentencing proce-
dures."' He noted, however, that the Williams decision allowed
the sentencing judge to consider as much information as possible
to determine the defendant's character and background."' Fur-
ther, he cited growing concern that the standard for reliability of
testimony was not high enough,"4 and concluded that "[tihere has
been a clear drift away from the absolute no-due-process-at-sen-
tence position some have read into Williams.""...
In discussing of the Confrontation Clause, Judge Weinstein
first emphasized the importance of the right of confrontation"6
and of the. sentencing process.' Next, he outlined three rudi-
mentary principles of the Confrontation Clause. First, the Confron-
107. 579 F.2d at 714.
108. ld. at 708-09.
109. Id. at 709.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 441 F. Supp. at 1289.
113. Id. at 1290.
114. Id. at 1291-92.
115. Id. at 1290 (citing Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony,
81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 827 (1968)).
116. Id. at 1295.
117. Id. at 1296.
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tation Clause and the hearsay rules, although generally construed
to protect similar values, are not congruent.11 Second, the Con-
frontation Clause imposes at least a good faith effort on the gov-
ernment to produce the witness."9 Lastly, the Framers designed
the Clause to protect against "'flagrant abuses, anonymous accus-
ers, and absentee witnesses."'
The court concluded from these principles that, "the govern-
ment cannot affirmatively prevent the defendant from examining
under oath a declarant when the declarant's knowledge is offered
by the government (1) at a critical stage of the criminal process,
(2) as to crucial information that (3) directly affects a substantial
liberty interest of the defendant." ' As he considered that this
requirement would not burden the sentencing process, and would
safeguard the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation
under the Sixth Amendment," Judge Weinstein held that the
sentencing judge could not rely on the informant's testimony un-
less he was subject to meaningful cross-examination."
In its consideration of the Faticos' appeal,24 the Second Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's ruling" without separately ana-
lyzing the Confrontation Clause issue. Judge Oakes, who authored
the majority opinion, followed Williams. He wrote, "it was not a
denial of due process in sentencing to rely on information supplied
by witnesses whom the accused could neither confront nor cross-
examine."" s The court agreed with the Williams decision that if it
extended confrontation rights,"v sentencing would become "im-
practical if not impossible."'"
Furthermore, Judge Oakes decided that the Confrontation
Clause issue was moot, because both it and the Due Process
Clause "are directed at ensuring the fairness of criminal proceed-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1297.
120. Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1299.
124. 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
125. Id. at 708-09.
126. Id. at 711.
127. The Williams decision was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, but the district court in Fatico used the Williams reasoning to address the Con-
frontation Clause issue. Id. at 710-12.
128. Id. at 712.
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ings by defining the situations in which confrontation by cross-
examination must be afforded a defendant."'" Because the court
decided that the two constitutional protections are substantially
similar, it interpreted the Williams rejection of confrontation under
the Due Process Clause to apply also to the Confrontation
Clause."3
B. Cases After the Imposition of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Williams, Specht, and Fatico all predate the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984. Williams held that due process confrontation did
not apply at sentencing; Specht followed Williams, allowing con-
frontation rights only in radically different sentencing systems; and
Fatico extended these analyses to also reject- confrontation at sen-
tencing under the Confrontation Clause. Since the Sentencing
Reform Act, however, there has been renewed discussion of
whether Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights
should apply at sentencing under the Guidelines. United States v.
Castellanos"' was the first case to raise the issue. Castellanos ob-
jected to the sentencing judge's consideration of information from
the trial of one of Castellanos's co-defendants. 32
On December 3, 1987, Alejandro Castellanos and a co-defen-
dant transported nine ounces of cocaine from Miami to Tampa,
Florida."3 In Tampa, Castellanos witnessed an exchange of the
cocaine, of which a DEA agent subsequently took possession."3
The sentencing judge relied on information contained in the pre-
sentence report, and found that Castellanos's offense involved over
five kilograms of cocaine. 35
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit theorized that it. is proper for
a sentencing judge to use evidence presented at the defendant's
own trial.' However, when the judge relies on evidence obtained
from the trial of another, the defendant has no opportunity to
cross-examine, make objections to evidence, or put on his own
129. Id. at 714.
130. Id.
131. 882 F.2d 474 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 904 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
132. 882 F.2d at 476.
133. Id. at 475.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 476.
136. Id. at 476-77.
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case.1" Therefore, the court ruled that the evidence obtained at a
co-defendant's trial should be excluded at Castellanos's sentenc-
ing.'
On rehearing en banc, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated
its earlier decision.' In his second opinion,1" Judge Tjoflat
more fully described Castellanos's objection. Castellanos challenged
his sentence on due process grounds, arguing that the Guidelines
had blurred the distinction between conviction and sentence, there-
fore requiring more stringent due process standards at sentenc-
ing." ' Castellanos based this contention on the fact that a defen-
dant may be convicted of a lesser offense under the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof, but sentenced for a more
serious offense without the safeguard of the higher burden of
proof."
Judge Tjoflat explained his earlier opinion to mean only that
a sentencing court must follow the procedural safeguards in the
Guidelines. These safeguards guarantee the defendant a right to
respond to information under consideration. 3 Also, the second
opinion recognized that the current system has not changed to a
pure determinate system, because there is still some room for de-
parture at sentencing.'" Because the current system still has ele-
ments of indeterminacy, the pre-Guidelines law on due process
rights at sentencing should apply. 45
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit having reached its second opin-
ion in Castellanos, the Tenth Circuit had found the first opinion
unpersuasive in United States v. Beaulieu.1" The Beaulieu court
had held that confrontation is not required at sentencing, but the
judge must find information to be reliable before considering it. 47
Beaulieu pleaded guilty in district court to one count of conspiracy
to manufacture amphetamines. ' The sentencing judge relied on
137. Id. at 477.
138. Id.
139. 904 F.2d 1490, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
140. Judge Tjoflat authored the panel opinion as well as the en banc decision.
141. Castellanos, 904 F.2d at 1494.
142. Id.
143. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3.
144. Castellanos, 904 F.2d at 1497.
145. Id.
146. 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990).
147. Id. at 1180-81.
148. Id. at 1178 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 846).
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testimony from the trial of Beaulieu's two brothers, also members
of the conspiracy, to increase his sentence.14' Beaulieu, relying on
the first Castellanos decision, challenged the sentencing court's use
of testimony from the trial of his brothers." °
The Beaulieu decision stated three reasons why there should
be no due process confrontation right at sentencing.15 First, a
defendant has no absolute right to confront witnesses who have
provided information to the court. 52 Second, the Sentencing
Guidelines do not require the exclusion of testimony originating
from a separate trial. 53 Lastly, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which bar much hearsay evidence from the determination of guilt
phase of a trial, do not apply at sentencing." Therefore, the
court concluded that reliable hearsay, including testimony from a
separate trial, could be used at sentencing.'" Neither Beaulieu
nor Castellanos, however, based his appeal on Confrontation
Clause rights." Consequently, neither the Tenth Circuit not the
Eleventh Circuit addressed that issue."
The district court decision in United States v. Luna " fol-
lowed the Beaulieu reasoning. The court surmised that the holding
in Beaulieu was more convincing and more in line with the Com-
mentary to section 6A1.3 of the Guidelines than was the first
Castellanos decision. 5' The Commentary states that information
may be used as long as it contains "sufficient indicia of reliability
to support its probable accuracy."" The court maintained that
the Guidelines do not change the sentencing procedure sufficiently
149. Id. at 1179.
150. Id.
151. Id. The case did not discuss the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
152. Id. at 1180.
153. Id. at 1181.
154. Id.; GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt.
155. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1181.
156. Id. at 1179; Castellanos, 904 F.2d at 1493.
157. Because the first Castellanos decision is unclear about which rights it is discuss-
ing, in Beaulieu the Tenth Circuit was unsure whether the Castellanos court grounded its
decision in the Due Process Clause of the' Fifth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, the Sentencing Guidelines, or the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180 n.4.
158. 734 F. Supp. 552, 554 (D. Me. 1990).
159. Id. at 554.
160. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt. (quoting United States v.
Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (D. Wis. 1981), affd, 719 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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such that Williams should be distinguished.' Therefore, a
defendant's due process right of confrontation is insufficient to
keep a court from using" evidence obtained from a proceeding
from which the defendant was absent, as long as the reliability of
the evidence satisfies the sentencing judge." Again, the court did
not analyze the Confrontation Clause.
The Eighth Circuit, however, did review the Confrontation
Clause in the case of United States v. Fortiel' in which the court
found that the Confrontation Clause does apply at sentencing.
Michael Fortier pleaded guilty to one count of possession with
intent to distribute 139 grams of cocaine." At sentencing the
judge considered an amount of cocaine in a count to which Mr.
Fortier had not pleaded guilty.'" Due to the consideration of this
additional amount of cocaine, the sentencing judge enhanced
Fortier's sentence.'" The defendant appealed, arguing that consid-
eration of an additional amount of cocaine, listed in a count to
which he had not pleaded guilty, violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause.'"
Judge Richard Arnold wrote the opinion of the court, and
posited that the sentence enhancement was based on multiple
hearsay, for which there was no independent finding of reliabili-
ty.1" In the presentence report, the probation officer linked
Fortier to 249 grams of cocaine through a report from a special
agent. This presentence report stated that a confidential informant
had told the special agent that a third person said the drugs be-
longed to Fortier.'" Judge Arnold held that "[t]he Confrontation
Clause requires that the government make its proof in a reliable
fashion; the absence of proper confrontation of witnesses calls into
question the integrity of the fact-finding process." 7'
To test the reliability of individual facts, Judge Arnold advo-
cated the following procedure: If the defendant disputes the facts
161. Luna, 734 F. Supp. at 554.
162. Id.
163. 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393
(8th Cir. 1992).
164. Id. at 101 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 103-04.
169. Id. at 103.
170. Id.
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in the presentence report, the court must state that it is not con-
sidering those facts, or make a finding resolving the dispute. This
finding must satisfy the Confrontation Clause."' Thus, to consider
hearsay at sentencing, the judge must find the declarant un-
available, and that the information has "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."1
In United States v. Kikumura, the Third Circuit rejected
the Fortier analysis. The court refused to extend Confrontation
Clause rights to sentencing,174 but did recognize that under the
Guidelines the defendant needs more procedural protections than
he needed under the indeterminate system.7 The Kikumura case
involved what was apparently the largest sentence enhancement in
absolute or percentage terms since the imposition of the Guide-
lines. 6 Kikumura challenged the admissibility at sentencing of
hearsay statements made by a confidential informant linking
Kikumura to the Japanese Red Army."7
Judge Edward Becker found the case a prime example of
both the utility and danger of determinate sentencing." Accord-
ing to Judge Becker, if the district court could not have enhanced
Kikumura's sentence, then his crimes would not have been ade-
quately punished.' The fairness of the proceeding, however, is
called into question when the sentencing judge hears evidence
post-trial, with significantly lower procedural protections for the
defendant."
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
173. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
174. Md. at 1102-03.
175. Id. at 1099.
176. Id. at 1089. Yu Kikumura was convicted of interstate transportation of explosive
devices under 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), and of passport offenses. 918 F.2d at 1094. His pre-
scribed Guidelines sentencing range was 27 to 33 months in prison. Id. At sentencing,
information from a confidential informant was considered, id. at 1096-97, which indicated
Kikumura had made three lethal homemade firebombs for a major terrorist bombing on
American soil. Id. at 1095-96. The district court departed from the Guidelines, finding
that the circumstances of Kikumura's offense were not adequately contemplated by the
Sentencing Commission. Id. at 1097. Thus, Kikumura was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Id. at 1098.
177. Id. at 1094.
178. Id. at 1099.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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Judge Becker went on to note that these significantly lower
procedural protections at sentencing have been upheld. 8' For in-
stance, the Constitution does not require trial by jury at sentenc-
ing." Also, the sentencing judge need only establish the facts
presented at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence."
Finally, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable at
sentencing."
The court concluded that the convicted criminal is not entitled
to the full force of the Constitution's procedural guarantees."
Because the trial judge has already made the determination of
guilt or innocence, the less crucial determination, sentencing, is not
worth further burdening the trial courts." In cases such as
Kikumura, however, where the sentencing hearing is "a tail which
wags the dog of the substantive offense," further procedural guar-
antees are necessary.'
The court proposed two possible solutions to this problem.
First, the legislature could more narrowly define the conduct that
can be considered for enhancement." Second, courts could raise
the level of procedural rights at sentencing so they are closer to
those at trial." Then, Judge Becker concluded that the former
solution was not in his judicial power;" and he was unwilling to
raise the procedural right of confrontation to a level that would
make the Confrontation Clause apply at sentencing. 9' Instead, he
advocated an intermediate standard under which hearsay state-
ments cannot be considered unless they are reasonably trustwor-
thy.19
181. Id.
182. Id; see, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).
183. 918 F.2d at 1099; see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding
that preponderance standard is generally constitutional); United States v. McDowell, 888
F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the preponderance standard is generally
appropriate in guidelines sentencing).
184. 918 F.2d at 1100; see FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
185. 918 F.2d at 1100.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1101 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).,
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. (noting that absent special circumstances, appellate court could not consid-
er an issue that the parties had failed to raise at trial).
191. Id. at 1102.
192. Id. at 1103. Because the commentary to § 6A1.3 of the Guidelines already re-
quired reliable information, Becker's intermediate standard merely asks judges to use
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In United States v. Silverman,1" the Sixth Circuit weighed
Fortier against Kikumura, and found the former more convinc-
ing.1" In Silverman, the police seized 52.9 grams of cocaine from
Silverman's duffel bag, after a government agent attempted to buy
cocaine from him. 9 The sentencing judge considered information
from a confidential informant that linked the defendant to an
additional kilogram of cocaine." Silverman appealed the sentenc-
ing determination, contending that the hearsay evidence at issue
was inadmissible because only evidence admissible at trial should
be considered." Silverman never made specific reference to the
Confrontation Clause.198
Judge Merritt, writing the majority opinion in Silverman, ex-
plained that the Sentencing Guidelines have revolutionized sen-
tencing and elevated factfinding to a greater importance.'" This
change is so significant that it renders pre-Guidelines law moot,
and requires a new balancing of procedural guarantees.' Relying
on Specht v. Patterson," Judge Merritt found that when a sen-
tencing system differs from the pre-Guidelines system enough, Wil-
liams no longer applies.' The nature of the Sentencing Guide-
lines makes sentencing adversarial in much the same way that the
Colorado system in Specht did, thus creating a system substantially
different from the pre-Guidelines indeterminate system.'0 3 This
difference creates the need for the Confrontation Clause to resolve
disputed facts that "'have a measurable effect on the applicable
punishment.' "W4
higher standards of reliability.
193. 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992)
(en banc).
194. See id. at *8-9.
195. See id. at *13 (Wellford, J., dissenting). Subsequently, Silverman pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at *2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
196. Id. at *3. At an evidentiary hearing, a DEA agent testified that a confidential
informant told authorities that he and others had become indebted to Silverman after he
advanced them a kilogram of cocaine. Id. The agent also testified that a co-conspirator
corroborated the informant's information. Id. The sentencing court found the information
admissible as relevant conduct, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 1B1.3(a)(2), and
aggregated the drug amounts. 1991 WL 179608, at *3.
197. 1991 WL 179608, at *4.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *8.
200. See id. at *7-8.
201. 386 U.S. 605 (1966).
202. 1991 WL 179608, at *8-9.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *9 (citation omitted); see GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3
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Judge Wellford, dissenting in Silverman, argued that there was
no Confrontation Clause issue. Judge Wellford contended that
Silverman did not appeal based on the Confrontation Clause, that
the majority merely created the issue in order .to adopt the hold-
ing of Fortier.' He further argued that, even if the Confronta-
tion Clause were at issue, the imposition of the Guidelines would
not make Williams irrelevant.' According to Judge Wellford,
"[t]here is simply no analogy to the situation under state law in
Specht and the panoply of due process protection afforded these
federal defeldants at their sentencing hearings."' Wellford also
distinguished Fortier from Silverman, citing Fortier's unusual triple
hearsay fact situation.'
This decision, however, has since been vacated. The Sixth
Circuit has held a rehearing en banc of Silverman.' The decision
reversed the earlier Sixth Circuit opinion, but did not fully address
the Confrontation and Due Process Clause issues.21 The majority
stated that the Guidelines had not sufficiently changed the sen-
tencing system so as to require new precedential protections. 1
In United States v. Wise,1 the Eighth Circuit considered a
similar argument. In that case, James Wise appealed a thirty-two
month sentence that he received after pleading guilty to two
counts of counterfeiting. Wise argued that the district court vio-
lated his due process rights when it did not allow him to call a
witness at sentencing.24 The court, however, transformed that ar-
gument into a Confrontation Clause issue.
21
Judge Arnold, writing for the majority, held that "[it was
error to base findings of fact on the probation officer's hearsay
testimony without undertaking the Confrontation Clause analysis
cmt.
205. 1991 WL 179608, at *12, *15 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at *23.
207. Id.
208. See id. at *25 & nn. 6-7. There is, however, no evidence in the Fortier opinion
that it was intended to be limited specifically to triple hearsay fact situations.
209. United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1507-08.
212. 923 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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required by United States v. Fortier."216 One judge concurred with
the result, but only because he believed Fortier compelled him to
do so."7 Another judge dissented, arguing that the court should
follow Kikumura.218
The Eighth Circuit, on its own initiative, held a rehearing en
banc.21' Wise was reversed, but the majority's opinion gave equal-
ly inadequate consideration to the Due Process and Confrontation
arguments. The court held that because the Guidelines had not
"so transformed the sentencing phase that it constitute[d] a sepa-
rate criminal proceeding."'
From Williams to Wise the courts have analyzed the issue of
confrontation rights at sentencing in a piecemeal fashion. No court
has clearly separated the rights offered by the Sixth Amendment
and those offered by the Fourteenth Amendment and conducted
an in-depth examination of whether these rights should apply at
sentencing. When these rights are analyzed separately, their
protections mandate confrontation rights at sentencing.
III. REASONING THROUGH THE RUBBLE
Confrontation rights should be extended to sentencing for two
reasons. First, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be
interpreted to require confrontation to ensure due process. The
test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge"1
indicates that to ensure due process at sentencing, confrontation is
necessary. Second, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-'
ment should apply to sentencing. The text of the Sixth Amend-
ment and the manner in which the courts have interpreted the
Amendment show that the Confrontation Clause applies under the
Guidelines.
A. Due Process
The courts have required due process at sentencing ever since
the Williams decision. ' Williams and Specht conceded that due
216. Id. at 87.
217. Id. (Wollman, J., concurring).
218. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).
219. 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
220. Id at 401.
221. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
222. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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process applies at sentencing, but held that under the indetermi-
nate sentencing system due process did not require confront-
ation. Morrissey v. Brewer m however, held that due process
rights change when surrounding circumstances change.' The
Court in Morrissey stated, "due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural, protections as the particular situation de-
mands."' Because the sentencing system has changed significant-
ly from the indeterminate system, the Guidelines require a new
due process analysis.
Although not a sentencing case, Mathews v. Eldridge' sets
forth a three-part test to identify the requirements of due process.
The first prong of this test assesses the private interest affected by
official action. 2  Second, the test inquires as to the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of the private interest.' Last, the Mathews test
evaluates the Government's interest that will be affected.' Un-
der this test, due process requires the right to confrontation at
sentencing under the Guidelines.
1. The Private Interest. The changes in the sentencing sys-
tem place defendants' liberty interests in jeopardy. United States v.
Mistretta"2' measured the impact of the newly created Guidelines
on individuals' liberty interests. On appeal, Mistretta challenged
the constitutionality of the Guidelines, contending that Congress
had created the U.S. Sentencing Commission in violation of the
separation of powers principle and that it had delegated excessive
authority to the Commission to structure the Guidelines.'
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that Congress did not del-
223. Id. at 245-51; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
224. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
225. Id. at 481.
226. Id.
227. 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
228. Id. at 335-39.
229. Id. at 335, 339-47.
230. Id. at 335, 347-48.
231. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The trial court held Mistretta under indictment on three
counts related to the sale of cocaine. Id. at 370. He pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to
distribute count, 21 U.S.C. § 846(b)(1)(B) (1988), was sentenced under the Guidelines to
18 months of imprisonment, and filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Id.
370-71. Petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court before judgment on the
appeal. Id. at 371.
232. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371.
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egate excessive power to the Commission. 3 The Court also held
that the Guidelines did not violate the separation of powers princi-
ple by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch or by allow-
ing the President to appoint the members of the Commission and
remove them for cause.' The majority recognized and spelled
out the important differences between the old indeterminate sys-
tem and 'the Guidelines,' noting that rehabilitation is no longer
the goal of sentencing,' and that Congress had decided that re-
habilitation is no longer a good reason to sentence people, because
the rehabilitative effects of our prison system are questionable at
best.'
Justice Blackmun also pointed out that all sentences are, for
the most part, determinate under the Guidelines." Sentencing
judges can only depart from the Guidelines in a few discrete cir-
cumstances. " The Sentencing Commission's Guidelines are bind-
ing on the courts' and provide for appellate review of sentences
issued under them." Appellate courts can reverse sentencing de-
terminations only if they find them clearly erroneous. 2
Justice Scalia's dissent found the changes in sentencing even
more radical than the majority did. He wrote that the Guidelines
"have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences crimi-
nal defendants are to receive."' Thus, Justice Scalia believed
that the Guidelines are unconstitutional, as Congress cannot create
an agency whose sole function is to make laws.' To back up his
argument, Justice Scalia pointed to substantive decisions made by
the Commission, including decisions to increase substantially the
average sentences for white-collar crimes such as public corruption,
antitrust violations, and tax evasion.'
233. Id. at 379.
234. Id. at 384.
235. Id. at 367-68.
236. Id. at 367.
237. Id. at 366.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1990).
243. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 419-22. Congress can delegate the authority to create regulations necessary
to enforce a law, but cannot delegate the authority to make the law itself. Id. at 417-19.
245. Id. at 413-14.
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Justice Scalia further pointed out that the contention that the
Guidelines merely narrow the statutorily prescribed sentence range
is misleading.' Because the "[s]tatutorily permissible sentences
for particular crimes cover as broad a range as zero years to
life," ' 7 Congress effectively allowed the Commission to determine
its own "statutory" maximums and minimums.'
Both opinions in Mistretta pointed out that the changes in the
structure of the sentencing system have exposed defendants to a
greater potential for deprivation of their liberty interests. Now that
Congress has expanded the statutorily prescribed maximums and
minimums, a defendant's liberty is in greater jeopardy. Because
the range between the statutory minimum and maximum can be so
large, adjustments for reliable relevant conduct may be so great
that the sentencing determination becomes "the tail that wags the
dog" of the substantive offense. United States v. Kikumura"9 is an
example of the defendant's disproportionate liberty interest at
sentencing, compared to the liberty interest at stake at trial. Be-
cause the sentencing judge determined that information concerning
relevant conduct was reliable, he increased Kikumura's jail time
from the Guidelines maximum of 33 months to 30 years.'
Kikumura thus received more than twenty-seven additional years
in prison. Such a tenfold increase in jail time highlights the extent
to which a defendant's liberty interests are in jeopardy at sentenc-
ing.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation. The Kikumura deci-
sion recognized the unfairness that may result from the combina-
tion of post-trial testimony and limited protections for the defen-
dant. First, because confrontation does not exist at sentencing, and
second, because the parties must prove sentencing facts under the
Guidelines only by a preponderance of the evidence, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the defendant's liberty interest is quite
high. These two factors, combined with the appellate courts' in-
246. Id. at 414-15. Congress imposes maximums and minimums for each federal crime.
These mandates are separate from the Guidelines, but operate to restrict the range of
sentence that a judge's use of the Guidelines may produce. Id. at 375.
247. Id. at 413 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) (kidnapping)).
248. Id.
249. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
250. Id. at 1097-98 (basing this substantial deviation from the Guidelines on several
aggravating factors).
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ability to reverse sentencing determinations unless they are clearly
erroneous, " 1 create a system with too great a risk of erroneous
deprivation of the defendant's liberty interest.
Furthermore, leaving the sentencing judge to decide whether
information is reliable also lowers the protection against false
information being used against a defendant. Because sentencing
determinations cannot be reversed unless clearly erroneous under
the Guidelines, very few determinations of reliability will be over-
turned. Allowing the sentencing judge to make determinations as
to the reliability of sentencing information is contrary to the
Guidelines' goals of certainty and reduced disparity.' This deter-
mination of reliability by the sentencing judge is one of the inde-
terminate aspects of the Guidelines. Although the Guidelines are
mostly determinate, this element of indeterminacy concerning the
reliability of evidence makes the system the worst of both worlds.
Judges are prescribed to give the sentences that result from the
Guidelines matrix, yet defendants and prosecutors cannot predict
the results of the sentencing judge's factual determinations.
3. The Government's Interest. The government's main inter-
est is in keeping the sentencing system as practical and efficient as
possible. The Williams decision indicated that applying confronta-
tion rights to sentencing would greatly reduce the amount of infor-
mation that judges can rely uponY Justice Black wrote, "[t]he
type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not
impossible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a
procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial
of collateral issues."'  Judge Oakes's decision in Fatico also cited
this quotation.'
These holdings show that there are a number of facts that the
sentencing judge needs to consider. Facts as to criminal history,'
relevant conduct,' and the adjustments in chapter 3 of the
Guidelines" must be considered. Some facts will not have been
251. United States v. Lanese, 840 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1989).
252. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 59-60, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3242-43.
253. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
254. Id. at 250.
255. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711-12 (2d Cir. 1978).
256. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 4A1.1.
257. Id. § 1B1.3.
258. Id. §§ 3A1.1-3E1.1 (including adjustments for a vulnerable victim or an official
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available at trial, such as those pertaining to obstruction of jus-
tice 9 and acceptance of responsibility. Further, when defen-
dants plead guilty, very few facts will have been resolved before
the sentencing hearing.
Extending confrontation rights will not prove to be impracti-
cal, nor will it prohibit these types of facts from being considered.
The court in United States v. Silverman"' stated that it "should
not prove a serious problem for district courts in most cases."'
The Silverman decision recommended a procedure that district
courts could follow:
In the cases in which there is a disputed material fact, the gov-
ernment can decide whether it will attempt to prove the fact
under the Confrontation Clause. In each such case the govern-
ment can decide whether it will seek to enhance the sentence
otherwise prescribed by the new code by proffering and attempt-
ing to prove such disputed facts. Upon receiving the
government's proffer, district courts may decide whether the
government's proffer of facts-if proved-would constitute
grounds requiring an increased sentence. If the district court
rejects the proffer as immaterial, it should sentence the defendant
on the basis of the undisputed facts of the charged offense, the
defendant's criminal history, and any other aggravating or miti-
gating factor provided for in the code. If the district court de-
cides that the proffered evidence in dispute would constitute
grounds for an increased sentence, it should then conduct an
evidentiary hearing in accordance with the Confrontation
Clause.'
Judge Merritt believed that following this procedure would protect
defendants' Confrontation Clause rights, with minimal burden on
the sentencing courts.
The above system would also solve a problem that prosecutors
experience under the Guidelines. Recall the opening hypotheti-
victim, restraint of the victim, role in the offense, 'efforts to obstruct justice, acceptance
of responsibility, and rules for multiple counts).
259. Id. § 3C1.1.
260. Id. § 3E1.1.
261. 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992)
(en banc).
262. Id. at *9.
263. Id. at *10.
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cal.' As illustrated in John Doe's case, the Guidelines severely
limit prosecutors' control over what information the judge consid-
ers. A prosecutor might bargain for a guilty plea, and later have
no control over whether his end of the bargain is upheld. For
instance, John's prosecutor could have decided not to present
information implicating John in the fifty prior drug sales. However,
the probation officer could include the information in the presen-
tence report, regardless of what the prosecutor does.
The system advocated in Silverman allows the prosecutor to
limit the amount of information the judge would consider, because
the judge would only consider information presented to him by the
prosecutor. If the prosecutor struck a bargain with the defendant,
then the prosecutor could choose not to present the information at
the evidentiary hearing. Also, this system would not prove to be
impractical because the number of full trials would actually de-
crease. Fewer defendants will plead guilty when they find out that
their plea cannot guarantee them less jail time. Further, defense
attorneys will take cases to full trial where they will be able to
cross-examine witnesses against the accused; by cross-examining
these witnesses at trial, a defense attorney will have the opportuni-
ty to confront evidence that might have a large impact at sentenc-
ing. Although applying confrontation to sentencing will increase
the number of evidentiary hearings, it also will decrease the num-
ber of full trials, saving time and money.
Finally, confrontation at sentencing will further the goals of
the Sentencing Reform Act that established the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.' Confrontation will effectively promote sentencing
certainty,66 proportionality, 7 and a reduction in disparity
among similarly situated offenders.' Because rehabilitation is no
longer the goal of sentencing,' the government no longer has a
stated interest in considering the possibly erroneous information
that confrontation will expel.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
265. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837 (codi-
fled principally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
266. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 24, at 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3239.
267. See id. at 50-52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3233-35.
268. Id. at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3235.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
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B. The Confrontation Clause
In 1949, when the Supreme Court decided Williams v. New
York,'0 Pointer v. Texas"1 had not yet incorporated the Con-
frontation Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment as a right in
state prosecutions. The idea of "ordered liberty" under Palko v.
Connecticut' was still the prevailing view. Therefore, it is not
surprising that Williams did not mention the Confrontation Clause.
Later cases, because they relied on Williams, also did not fully
address this issue. Thus, the issue of whether the Confrontation
Clause applies at sentencing under the Guidelines should be con-
sidered independent of Williams.
At sentencing, courts have confused the application of the
Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth AmendmentY3 The analyses of the two Clauses have a
common thread: Both consider the defendant's interests that are in
jeopardy. The analyses of the two clauses, however, are different.
The Due Process Clause considers the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion and the government's interests. The Confrontation Clause,
though, does not consider these factors. Although it is clear that
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process applies to
sentencing, it is unclear whether its guarantees include confronta-
tion at sentencing. It is unclear whether the Sixth Amendment's
guarantees apply at sentencing, but it is clear that it guarantees
confrontation. Under the Confrontation Clause, confrontation
rights exist even if the risk of erroneous deprivation is small or if
their extension will be impractical for the government. The private
interests, however, should be considered to determine that sentenc-
ing fits within the Sixth Amendment's definition of when the
Clause should apply.
Courts' interpretation of "the Sixth Amendment's "witness
against him" and "criminal prosecutions" clauses need to be over-
come to extend the clause to sentencing. Furthermore; the Guide-
lines commentary does not exclude the Confrontation Clause from
sentencing. Courts also need to overcome their conception of the
270. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
271. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
272. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (discussing the idea that only some of the protections in
the Bill of Rights apply in state proceedings).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Castellanos, 882 F.2d 474 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 904
F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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guarantees of the Sixth Amendment as trial rights. This Section
first addresses the three textual problems. Second, it will advocate
that confrontation during sentencing is within the definition of
when the Clause should be applied.
1. Textual Problems.
a. Informants at sentencing are "witnesses against
him."' 4 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the defendant the right to confront only the "witnesses
against" him.' Critics of the application of the Confrontation
Clause at sentencing argue that persons offering information only
upon punishment are not "witnesses against" the accused." Be-
cause they do not testify to facts concerning guilt or innocence,
their testimony is not subject to the rigors of the Confrontation
Clause. The case of Dowdell v. United States' supports this posi-
tidn. Dowdell held that the trial judge, the clerk of the court, and
the official reporter, were not witnesses against the accused when
they supplemented the trial record at sentencing."8 The basis of
the Supreme Court's decision was that the individuals were not
giving information about the defendant's guilt or innocence."
Therefore, the Court did not allow the accused the protection of
confrontation rights as to their testimony, provided by a provision
in the Philippines Constitution based on the Sixth Amendment.' °
However, the issue in Dowdell is quite different from that
which arises under the Sentencing Guidelines. In Dowdell, the
three defendants argued that the district court had not properly
arraigned them."1 The appellate court called upon the official
reporter of the court to certify that "his notes of the proceedings
showed that the plaintiffs in error were arraigned, waived reading
of the complaint and pleaded not guilty."' The district court
judge testified "that the reporter was the duly appointed, qualified
274. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., Castellanos, 882 F.2d at 474.
277. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
278. Id. at 330.
279. Id. at 330-31.
280. Id. at 329-30.
281. Id. at 328.
282. Id.
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and acting reporter of the district."'  The reporter's certificate
merely echoed the clerk's certificate.'
Therefore, the testimony by the three court officials did not
affect the defendants' liberty interests. Instead the information was
merely procedural. These individuals were not witnesses against
the accused, because they did not threaten any liberty or property
interest' of the accused at trial. In sentencing hearings, however,
those presenting information have a profound impact upon the
liberty interest of the defendants.
Because rehabilitation is no longer the goal of sentencing, the
length of time it will take to reform the convict is no longer an
important issue. Instead, sentencing is now an extension of the
determination of guilt or innocence. The government seeks to
punish the offender, or deter future crime, by deciding the serious-
ness of the offense in question and allocating punishment accord-
ingly. This process was intended to achieve added reliability and
fairness in the system, but it changed sentencing to an analysis of
the defendant's relative guilt. Thus, those presenting information at
sentencing are witnesses as to guilt or innocence.
The Guidelines have merely separated the determination of
guilt or innocence into two factfinding endeavors. The first, at
trial, is a broad determination of overall blameworthiness. The
second, at sentencing, is a fine-tuning designed to punish those
similarly situated, with close to equal sentences.
Justice Scalia supported this view in his dissent in Mistretta v.
United States.' He stated, "While the products of the Sentencing
Commission's labors have been given the modest name 'Guide-
lines,' they have the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sen-
tences criminal defendants are to receive."' The Sentencing
Commission has made sentencing a mini-trial in which the factual
determinations of relative guilt or innocence have great effect on
the defendant's liberty and property.
Justice Scalia also indicated that many of the Congressionally
mandated statutory ranges are from zero to life.' This fact fur-
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Fines can be assessed under the Guidelines. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 2, § 5E1.2.
286. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
287. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
288. Id.
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ther evidences that the sentencing system of today is the two-step
process described above. If Congress gives no more direction than
providing a range of zero to life, then the sentencing judge's deter-
mination of fact§ is indeed of utmost importance.
b. Sentencing falls in the category "criminal prosecu-
tions." The Sixth Amendment begins with the phrase "In all
criminal prosecutions," and then explains the rights that will be
protected. The majority opinion in United States v. Kikumuraul
asserted that "criminal prosecution" does not include sentenc-
ing.' According to Kikumura, once the trial court has found a
defendant guilty, arguably the criminal prosecution has ended.291
Courts have extended other rights protected by the Sixth
Amendment past trial, though. The right of assistance to counsel
has been held applicable at sentencing.' In addition, the sen-
tencing judge must inform the defendant of the nature of the
information considered.293 Each protection has been weighed in
light of the type of hearing at issue to determine its necessity to
the defendant. Therefore, because courts have extended some of
the protections of the Sixth Amendment past trial, each individual
protection and individual hearing must be analyzed. Further, as
noted above, it is far from clear that the criminal prosecution or
the- determination of guilt or innocence is finished when the trial
ends.'
c. The Guidelines commentary does not exclude the Con-
frontation Clause from sentencing. The Commentary to section
6A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines states:
In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not re-
stricted to information that would be admissible at trial. Any
information may be considered, so long as it has "sufficient indi-
cia of reliability to support its probable accuracy." Reliable hear-
say evidence may be considered. Out-of-court declarations by an
unidentified informant may be considered "where there is good
289. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
290. Id. at 1102.
291. Id.
292. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
293. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 26(e),
at 1109-10 (2d ed. 1992).
294. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
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cause for the nondisclosure of its identity and there is sufficient
corroboration by other means." Unreliable allegations shall not
be considered.' 5
Because the Commentary states that reliable hearsay can be con-
sidered, opponents of extending the Confrontation Clause to sen-
tencing argue that sentencing courts can consider testimony with-
out confrontation. United States v. Miller"M and United States v.
Robinson2 ' support this argument, both holding that reliable
hearsay testimony can be admitted.
The test for reliable hearsay, however, should include analysis
under the Confrontation Clause. The Guidelines commentary does
not state that it excludes the Confrontation Clause from this test
for reliability, because it does not have the power to do so. Dis-
puted facts, which "have a measurable effect on the applicable
punishment,"298 should be tested under the Confrontation Clause
to ensure their reliability. If application of the Confrontation
Clause would exclude information, then that information must not
have been reliable. United States v. Silverman2' supports this po-
sition, stating that "the reliability of the district courts' findings of
fact must be tested under the principles established by the Con-
frontation Clause."'
2. The Confrontation Clause Is a Trial Right. Some cases,
although not dealing with sentencing, have referred to the Con-
frontation Clause as a trial right. Dutton v. EvansT ' stated that
the Confrontation Clause applies to "the truth-determining process
in criminal trials."' In Coy v. Iowa,' the court applied the
Confrontation Clause only to "those who appear and give evidence
at trial."' As well, Kentucky v. Stincer" posited that the Con-
295. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt. (citations omitted).
296. 910 F.2d 1321, 1328 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 980 (1991).
297. 898 F.2d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1990).
298. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt.
299. 1991 WL 179608 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992)
(en banc).
300. Id. at *9.
301. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
302. Id. at 89.
303. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
304. Id. at 1016 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
305. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
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frontation Clause applies only when it is needed to protect the
opportunity for effective cross-examination.'
The Guidelines have changed the sentencing system enough so
that it now falls under what courts have meant by a trial right.
Specifically, three changes distinguish the Guidelines from the
indeterminate system that preceded it, and explain why the Con-
frontation Clause can now be applied. The first change is the
present two-tier guilt determination. Second, the goal of the sen-
tencing system is no longer rehabilitation. Lastly, the Guidelines
set up an adversarial system.
a. The two-tier guilt determination. Under the Guide-
lines the sentencing judge is no longer allowed to exercise com-
plete discietion. Now, judges must conduct specific factual determi-
nations that have specified sentence departures connected* with
them. These factual determinations are mini-trials that significantly
affect the defendant's liberty interests. Therefore, sentencing has
become a process for judging the relative guilt of the defendant,
and is sufficiently like a trial that the Confrontation Clause should
be extended to cover it.
b. The goals of sentencing. A major difference between
the Guidelines system and the old indeterminate system is that
Congress decided that rehabilitation is no longer the goal of feder-
al criminal sentencing.' Retribution, education, deterrence, and
incapacitation has become the operating goals of the Guide-
lines.' Further, the Sentencing Commission created the Guide-
lines with Congress's stated objective of decreasing sentence dis-
parities between similarly situated offenders.'
Unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge is no longer the
rule. The Guidelines have reduced the number of facts a judge
must consider, while increasing the importance of the decisions
that are made. The importance of reliable factfinding has therefore
been elevated so that disparity in sentencing can be reduced as
much as possible. Under a system designed to promote rehabilita-
tion, the sentencing judge needed access to a large amount of
306. Id. at 740.
307. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988).
308. Id. § 991(b)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988).
309. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, at 2.
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information in order to determine the individual defendant's ca-
pacity to be rehabilitated. The determinate system needs less infor-
mation. This decrease in needed information serves to make sen-
tencing much more like trial. The Guidelines call for individual
factual determinations that then give a prescribed sentence en-
hancement. This procedure mimics the way trials call for the deter-
mination of a set number of facts that determine whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent.
c. The Guidelines system is adversarial. The indeter-
minate system was not adversarial, but the Guidelines system
is.31 In the indeterminate system, the sentencing judge conducted
an investigation privately, independent of the lawyers.' 1 The old
system did not allocate burdens of proof between the parties, and
did not require the judge to base the sentence on the existence of
a particular fact or group of facts.312 Also, there were no rules re-
quiring judges to disclose the information utilized in the determi-
nation? 3
The Guidelines system has completely changed the indetermi-
nate, non-adversarial system by introducing the sentencing hearing
and emphasizing accurate and reliable factfinding.3 4 The Guide-
lines have made the finding of particularized facts (for example,
existence of a weapon, knowledge that the money came from the
sale of narcotics) dispositive upon the sentence that will be re-
ceived. Sentences may double, triple, or even increase tenfold due
to the existence of these facts.3"5 Also, defendants are allowed ac-
cess to the information being used against them, and are allowed
to present their own evidence pertaining to that information. The
Guidelines themselves recognize the added importance of reliable
factfinding.316 They note that adversarial hearings will sometimes
be necessary to ensure reliability of information.3 7 The ad-
310. United States v. Silverman, 1991 WL 179608, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1991),
vacated, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, § 6A1.3 cmt. ("An evidentiary hearing
may sometimes be the only reliable way to resolve disputed issues."):
317. See id.
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versarial nature of the Guidelines further characterizes the sen-
tence hearing as a mini-trial, and thus brings it within the power
of the Confrontation Clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Confrontation rights should apply at sentencing under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The analyses of these two
Clauses are different, but both effectively extend confrontation
rights to sentencing.
Much has changed since the courts analyzed whether the Due
Process Clause mandated confrontation under the indeterminate
sentencing system. The restructuring of the sentencing system has
greatly increased the defendant's liberty interests at risk under the
Guidelines. The limited appellate review of this process has en-
hanced the, chance that those interests will be erroneously de-
prived. Also, because rehabilitation is no longer a goal, and the
Guidelines system has limited information needed at sentencing,
the extension of due process confrontation rights will not be im-
practical for the government. Therefore, under the Guidelines the
Due Process Clause mandates confrontation during sentencing.
The Confrontation Clause protects against "anonymous accus-
ers, and absentee witnesses.""3 ' Individuals who present informa-
tion at sentencing are witnesses against the accused. The Confron-
tation Clause must be extended to protect against anonymous
accusers presenting false information. The sentencing hearing has
changed under the Guidelines to an adversarial determination of
guilt. Anonymous accusers should be restricted from depriving a
defendant's liberty interests at these trial-like proceedings.
Again, recall John Doe's plight. Without confrontation rights
during sentencing John had to serve a minimum of six months in
prison. The only evidence of reliability of the information used
against John was the' DEA agent's assertion that the informant
had proved reliable in the past. Allowing confrontation would have
given John the opportunity to respond effectively to the informa-
tion used against him. It also might have prevented him from
spending six months in prison for crimes he did not commit.
318. United States v. Fatico, 441 F. Supp. 1285, 1297 (1977) (quoting California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 179 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.
1978).
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